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AIR TRAVEL AND THE NO FLY LIST-THE DISTRICT OF
OREGON RECOGNIZES A CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO FLY
EMILY LEEZER LANDEROS*
IN LATIE V HOLDER, the U.S. District Court for the District of
Oregon held that a group of U.S. citizens and legal perma-
nent residents had a constitutionally protected right to interna-
tional air travel that was affected by the group's placement on
the Terrorist Screening Center's (TSC) "No Fly List."' Although
many previous courts have affirmed a right to travel, this
landmark case marks the first time a federal court has explicitly
recognized a constitutional right to fly.2 At a time when traveling
internationally by means other than flying is impractical, either
because it is too costly or too time-consuming, the court cor-
rectly held that Americans have 'a constitutionally protected
right to fly. 3 However, the court incorrectly deferred ruling on
whether the judicial review process available to the plaintiffs to
challenge their continued inclusion on the No Fly List consti-
tuted adequate due process.' The court should have found that
the government's procedures violated the plaintiffs' Fifth
Amendment right to due process because (1) there was suffi-
cient information on the record to find that the judicial review
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2015; B.A., Government, The
University of Texas at Austin, 2012. The author would like to thank her family,
friends, and husband, AJ, for their love and support.
I Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *2-3, *9 (D. Or.
Aug. 28, 2013).
2 See Id. at *7, *9. But see Gilmore v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1125, 1136 (9th Cir.
2006) ("[T]he Constitution does not guarantee the right to travel by any particu-
lar form of transportation."); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545
WHA, 2012 WL 6652362, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012) ("The right to travel
here and abroad is an important constitutional right. . . . [However,] the Consti-
tution does not ordinarily guarantee the right to travel by any particular form of
transportation . . . .").
3 See Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *3, *9.
4 See id. at *3, *13-14.
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process had a high risk of error, and (2) the government could
provide the plaintiffs constitutionally adequate notice without
jeopardizing its interest in maintaining national security.' None-
theless, this noteworthy decision, which effectively affords citi-
zens prohibited from flying overseas the right to due process,6
will likely have a substantial impact on future cases involving
challenges to the No Fly List and the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) screening measures.
The TSC, managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), maintains a Terrorist Screening Database (Database), of
which the No Fly List is a subsection.' Individuals are nominated
to the No Fly List on the basis of a "'reasonable suspicion' that
the individuals are known or suspected terrorists."' The TSC
never releases the criteria or guidelines used for placing individ-
uals on the list.' The TSC then furnishes the No Fly List to the
TSA for use in its screening of airplane passengers.10 People
seeking redress for any screening issues experienced at an air-
port must use the Department of Homeland Security Traveler
Redress Inquiry Program (DHS TRIP) by submitting an inquiry
form detailing their complaints." If the traveler matches an
identity in the Database, DHS TRIP forwards the complaint to
the TSC to determine whether the traveler should remain in the
Database." After the TSC's determination is made, DHS TRIP
sends a determination letter to the complainant; however, the
letter does not confirm whether the complainant is even on the
No Fly List, give any explanation as to why the complainant may
be on the list, or provide any assurance that the complainant
may fly again in the future." Occasionally, the determination
letter directs the complainant to seek administrative appeal with
the TSA or judicial review in a federal court of appeals, but the
5 See id. at *10-13; see Amended Memorandum of Points & Authorities in Sup-
port of Plaintiffs' Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at *19, *24-30,
Latif 2013 WL 4592515 (No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Memo];
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of Plaintiffs' Cross-
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment at *10-17, Latif 2013 WL 4592515 (No.
3:10-CV-00750-BR) [hereinafter Amicus Brief].
6 See Latif 2013 WL 4592515.




11 Id. at *1, *2.
12 Id. at *2.
13 Id. at *3.
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traveler is never afforded an opportunity to challenge or correct
any criteria upon which the TSC's determination is made."
The plaintiffs, thirteen U.S. citizens and permanent residents,
including four veterans, were prohibited from boarding flights
to or from the United States or over U.S. air space after January
1, 2009.15 Some were actually notified of their placement on the
TSC's No Fly List while others were not." Each plaintiff, how-
ever, unsuccessfully contested his or her placement on the list
through the DHS TRIP process." Because of their inclusion on
the No Fly List, many of the plaintiffs have been unable to visit
family, including wives and children; take religious pilgrimages;
attend school; or pursue business opportunities overseas without
the risk of being detained and interrogated by authorities."
After failing to remove themselves from the list and receiving
no explanation as to why they were prohibited from flying, the
plaintiffs brought this action against the Director of the FBI, the
Director of the TSC, and the U.S. Attorney General.19 The plain-
tiffs alleged that the defendants violated their right to procedu-
ral due process by failing to give them post-deprivation notice or
any significant opportunity to challenge their placement on the
No Fly List. 20 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that
the defendants' practices violate the Fifth Amendment; they also
requested
an injunction requiring [the d]efendants (1) to remedy such vio-
lations, including removal of [p]laintiffs' names from any watch
list or database that prevents them from flying; (2) to provide
[p]laintiffs with notice of the reasons and bases for [their] inclu-
sion on the No Fly List; and (3) to provide [p]laintiffs with the
opportunity to contest such inclusion.
The plaintiffs first filed the action in 2010, and, on May 3,
2011, the court "issued an [o]rder granting [the d]efendants'
[m]otion to [d]ismiss for failure to join the [TSA] as an indis-
pensable party and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction" under
a federal statute. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the
14 Id.
15 Id. at *1-6.
16 Id. at *3.
17 See id.
18 Id. at *3-6.
19 Id. at *1-3.
20 Id. at *1.
21 Id.
22 Id. at *2.
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TSA could be added as an indispensable party and that the dis-
trict court had original jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims.
The case was then remanded back to the district court.24 The
parties subsequently filed cross-motions for partial summary
judgment.2 6 On remand, the district court granted in part the
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment by holding that the
plaintiffs had "constitutionally-protected interests both in inter-
national air travel and reputation" that were affected by their
inclusion on a list of suspected terrorists, as was required for
their procedural due process claim.2 ' The court, however, de-
ferred ruling on the remaining parts of the cross-motions be-
cause it was unable to resolve: (1) whether the DHS TRIP
process creates a risk of erroneous deprivation of the plaintiffs'
liberty interests based on the current record; or (2) "whether
the judicial-review process is a sufficient, post[-] deprivation pro-
cess under the United States Constitution."2 7
The court made the correct decision in holding that the
plaintiffs had a constitutionally protected right to international
air travel, but it incorrectly stopped short when it deferred rul-
ing on the most important issue-whether the defendants actu-
ally violated the plaintiffs' Fifth Amendment right to due
process.28 The court should have granted the declaratory judg-
ment and the injunction the plaintiffs so desperately sought be-
cause there was, in fact, sufficient information on the record to
find that (1) the DHS TRIP created a risk of erroneous depriva-
tion of a personal liberty, and (2) the judicial review recourse
was an insufficient post-deprivation process. 29
To determine whether the government accorded to the plain-
tiffs adequate due process, the court applied the three-factor
balancing test established in Mathews v. Eldridge and balanced":
(1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action;
(2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through
the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of addi-




26 Id. at *6-7, *10, *14.
27 Id. at *10-13, *14.
28 See id. at *10-14.
29 See id.
30 Id. at *6-14.
(3) the [g]ovemment's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would entail.s"
The court found that the first factor of the Mathews test was satis-
fied because the plaintiffs had "constitutionally-protected liberty
interests both in international air travel and reputation"; these
interests were affected by the TSC's addition of the plaintiffs'
names to the No Fly List, which constituted an official action. 2
In finding that the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to fly in-
ternationally," the court broadened the fifty-five-year-old prece-
dent established in Kent v. Dulles, in which the right to travel
was first recognized.35 The court further found that under the
"stigma-plus doctrine," the plaintiffs had a "constitutionally-pro-
tected liberty interest" in their "good name, reputation, honor,
[and] integrity," which were stigmatized by their inclusion on a
list of suspected terrorists.3 ' The court recognized, rightfully so,
that in the modern world, traveling internationally by way of
flight is no longer a "mere convenience" but rather a necessity.
This expansion of precedent is especially meaningful consider-
ing the realities of our world today-namely the increased pop-
ularity of foreign travel and surge in international business-
and the evolving views among courts regarding the importance
of air travel.
The establishment of a constitutional right to fly was, how-
ever, not a sufficient ruling for the plaintiffs. The court deferred
ruling on whether the judicial review process of the DHS TRIP
provided the plaintiffs with adequate due process and thus
failed to provide the plaintiffs relief.39 The court was wrong to
defer ruling on this issue because there was indeed sufficient
information to determine that the defendants violated the plain-
31 Id. at *6-7 (citing Mathews v. Eldrige, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)).
32 Id. at *7-10.
3 Id. at *10.
34 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
3 See id. at 124-26; see Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *7.
36 Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *9-10.
3 See id. at *8.
38 See id. ("[T]he Court disagrees with Defendants' contention that interna-
tional air travel is a mere convenience in light of the realities of our modern
world."); Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2012 WL
6652362, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 20, 2012) ("[T]he fact remains that for interna-
tional travel, air transport in these modern times is practically the only form of
transporation, travel by ship being prohibitively expensive.
3 Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *6, *13-14.
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tiffs' right to due process.40 First, the DHS TRIP, including the
available judicial review recourse, fails to provide the plaintiffs
sufficient notice and a "meaningful opportunity to be heard.""
Second, requiring the government to provide a hearing and
constitutionally adequate notice would not endanger national
security.4 2 Although the court correctly found that the DHS
TRIP process-through the determination-letter step-failed to
provide the plaintiffs with a hearing or post-deprivation notice,
it declined to analyze whether the availability of judicial review
was sufficient due process because "the current record in [the]
case [was] not sufficiently developed." 3 The court failed to rec-
ognize that the record was sufficient enough to find that the
judicial appeal process, just like the DHS TRIP, fails to provide
post-deprivation notice and also fails to avoid the risk of errone-
ous deprivation of a private interest."
Adequate notice and a hearing are the two key requirements
of the Fifth Amendment right to procedural due process.4 5 Yet,
without first being sufficiently notified, parties cannot enjoy
their right to be heard.4 6 "Notice is insufficient when an individ-
ual does not have adequate information and an opportunity to
correct any errors that may have led to the deprivation."4 ' A per-
son challenging his placement on the No Fly List via DHS TRIP
is never informed of the reasons for being included on the list, or
if he or she is even on the list at all." Therefore, although a
judicial review of the TSC's determination may provide a person
with an opportunity to be heard, it does not provide sufficient
notice. Moreover, because the government refuses, as a matter
of national security, to provide claimants with any explanation
40 See Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 5, at *8-10.
41 Id. at *19.
42 Id. at *26-30.
43 See Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *13.
44 See id. at *12 ("[B]ecause of the lack of information contained in the DHS
TRIP determination letters, [plaintiffs] 'do not know what to appeal, whether to
appeal, or how best to advocate for themselves on appeal."' (quoting Plaintiffs'
Memo, supra note 5, at *21 n.33)).
4 See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80 (1972) ("For more than a century the
central meaning of procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights
are to be affected are entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that
right they must first be notified."' (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233
(1863))).
46 Id.
47 Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *10.
48 Id. at *11.
for their inclusion on the No Fly List,4 9 the judicial review pro-
cess creates a risk that claimants' liberty interest in international
flight will be erroneously deprived.5 o Failing to provide adequate
notice creates a high risk of "erroneous deprivation" because it
"force[s] people to 'guess[ ] what evidence' they should submit
in their defense, driving them to 'respond[ ] to every possible
argument against denial at the risk of missing the critical one
altogether.' "5 Even during the judicial review process here, the
government failed to provide the plaintiffs with any notice con-
cerning the reasons for prohibiting them from flying or whether
they were even on the No Fly List to begin with; therefore, there
was sufficient information on the record to find that the judicial
review process fails to satisfy the requirements of due process.12
In addition to creating a high risk of error in the judicial re-
view process, the defendants also failed to provide the plaintiffs
with adequate due process because the government can provide
claimants with post-deprivation notice of the reasons for their
inclusion on the No Fly List without burdening the govern-
ment's national security interest." The third factor of the Ma-
thews test "requires the [c]ourt to weigh the government's
interest, 'including the function involved and the fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural
requirement would entail.'"5 Here, the defendants argued that
the current redress procedure under DHS TRIP, including the
availability of recourse to appellate courts, is constitutionally suf-
ficient in light of the government's interest in "maximiz[ing]
the nation's security, without fear that such information will be
disclosed whenever anyone cannot travel as he or she might
choose."5 Instead of evaluating the defendants' illogical argu-
ment, the court deferred ruling on it because the court allegedly
did not have sufficient information to assess the second factor of
the Mathews test-the risk of erroneous deprivation-and there-
fore could not "weigh the government's interests against the
current review process . . . available to [the p]laintiffs . . . to
49 See id.
50 See id.; Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 5, at *24-26.
51 Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 5, at *24 (quoting Barnes v. Healy, 980 F.2d
572, 579 (9th Cir. 1992)).
52 See Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *11.
53 See Plaintiffs' Memo, supra note 5, at *26-30; Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at
*13-17.
54 Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *13 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)).
55 Id.
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determine whether additional or alternative procedural require-
ments [were] necessary or possible.""6
However, the court had sufficient information on the record
to assess both the second and third Mathews factors and find that
the government can safely provide the plaintiffs with post-depri-
vation notice and a hearing without jeopardizing national secur-
ity.5 7 The Constitution Project, acting as amicus curiae for the
plaintiffs, refuted the defendants' national security concerns
with well-founded arguments." For instance, providing the
plaintiffs with the reasons underlying their placement on the No
Fly List would not help possible terrorists avoid detection be-
cause these plaintiffs have been alerted to the fact that they were
already under government watch when they were stopped by air-
port security, prohibited from boarding, and possibly interro-
gated by FBI agents.5 9 Additionally, in Rahman v. Chertoffoo the
court rejected a similar argument made by the TSC that telling a
claimant he or she is not on the list would encourage the claim-
ant to engage in terrorist activity."' The court found that, in real-
ity, just the opposite would be encouraged because when
claimants are surrounded by TSA agents at the airport and pre-
vented from boarding their flights, they are made aware that
they are under the watchful eye of law enforcement.6 2 Finally,
the nation's courts frequently adjudicate matters involving sensi-
tive information without endangering national security, includ-
ing Guantanamo Bay habeas cases and cases involving the
Freedom of Information Act.6" The government can safely ac-
cord to the plaintiffs and all citizens the necessary notice
needed to contest their placement on the No Fly List, and fed-
eral courts can confidently provide a hearing to rule on issues
involving sensitive information without endangering our coun-
try's security by using techniques to safeguard the information,
including protective orders and in camera proceedings."
The U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon correctly
held that the plaintiffs had a liberty interest in flying, which was
56 Id. at *6-7, *13.
57 Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at *13-27.
58 See id. at *12-27.
59 Id. at *13-14; see Latif 2013 WL 4592515, at *3-6.
60 No. 05 C 3761, 2008 WL 4534407 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2008), rev'd on other
grounds, 530 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2008).
61 Id. at *6; Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at *14-16.
62 See Rahman, 2008 WL 4534407, at *6; Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at *15-16.
63 Amicus Brief, supra note 5, at *18.
64 See id. at *19-20.
RIGHT TO FLY
affected by official action, but the court incorrectly declined to
rule on whether the defendants violated the plaintiffs' due pro-
cess rights. By failing to hold the government accountable for
depriving the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to due pro-
cess, the court not only increased the risk that innocent people
will suffer reputational harm and be prohibited from flying, but
also condoned the government's wrongful infringement of its
citizens' liberties-a behavior the Founding Fathers strived to
eliminate in drafting the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment.6 5 Nonetheless, the court's recognition of a consti-
tutional right to fly will undoubtedly impact future cases. The
court's establishment of a liberty interest in air travel represents
a shifting attitude regarding the importance of the freedom to
travel abroad. Despite the court's failure to provide the plaintiffs
relief, this shifting attitude will certainly have an effect on the
No Fly List, airport screening procedures, and other govern-
mental measures that infringe upon citizens' right to travel in-
ternationally in the future.
65 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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